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I H SUPREMe: COURT 
BRIEF: 
IN THE 
Supreme Court 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH OOP,PER OOMP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STEPHEN HA'Y.S ESTATE, Inc., a 
corporation of Utah, JULIA HAYS 1 No. 5302 
HOGE, STEPHEN J. HAYS, 
LAWRENCE J. HA Y:S, MRS 
LOU GOREY, MRS. E<THEL V. 
REILLEY and MARY LOUISE 
O'DONNELL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPEL-
LANTS' ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING. 
In this reply we have no intention of devoting much 
space to comment upon defendants' discussion by their 
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answer to petition for rehearing that a reasonable 
framiliari,ty ·with the record, the issues and the bniefs 
filed, will disclose as obvious bombast. If after all that 
has been written and said in this case this Court can 
take stock in such assertion, it would be a waste of time 
for us to be led into an analysis of the several state-
ments that compose that answer. Suffice it to say that 
we have intended no insult to this Court, and of course 
have not insulted this Court, nor has there been the 
least change in a single theory we originally entertained 
in this suit. Our course has been consistent from its 
inception. We founded our right to condemn upon 
many theories, none of which either were or are in-
consistent. We have argued them all earnestly and 
sincerely, and we stand upon them all today as we did 
when the complaint was filed. There could be no more 
convincing assurance of our respect for this court than 
the effort we are now making. 
The nature of a suit to condemn, its future aspects 
only, the distinctions between such a suit and a suit to 
quiet title, the legal effect of the order to occupy, the 
legal effect of the grant of an easement for the con-
veyance of copper solutions thereafter to be produced, 
the eff~ct accordingly of the judgment in conde:rnn:ation 
and its relation ba<lk to the order to occupy, the nature 
of these cop.per solutions, the artificial manner of their 
production, their characteristics as a manufactured pro-
duct, plaintiff's labor and investment in their produc-
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1tion, rthe purrJhase in fee of the drainage 'aTea rof Dixml 
Gulch within which to deposit them, the law as we con-
ceive it to be when applied to such a product and our 
use of the natural (lhannel or creek bed of Dixon Gul<:lh 
for the conveyancl'l of that product to our intake for 
these and other jsi,milar solutions elsewhere produced 
then being com;ey,eq:to plaintiff's precipitating plants 
for the second stage qf their treat~ent, the filing with 
the State Engineer before the creation of the Dixon 
Gulch dumps of a~. application to_ appropriate the cop-
per solutions thereafter to be produced, wherein the 
point of diversion was fixed at the Hays Spring, lest 
the solutions to be produced be held waters of a char-
acter whereof the State Engineer might have jurisdic-
tion,-all these a'spects of -1:!hi:s suiit 1;nd' po~nts in the 
argument, and more, have been exhaustively discussed 
in the briefs and in oral argument. But there is at 
least one that in the course of all this argument counsel 
have been content to pass with the least possi'ble refer-
ence,-we suspect rin the hope that 1it would not be em-
phasized. The point to which we refer is the following: 
"V. POINT: 
''A liquid or artificial increment artificially 
produced and added to a natural stream or intro-
duced into a natural channel, by the labor of man 
without intent to abandon, belongs to the man 
whose labor produced it or brought it there when 
na:turrally it would nort have existed there. Such 
liquid increment may be taken out of the natural 
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stream or channel by its owner and may be re-
captured and reclaimed by him at sueh ;point on 
the natural channel as may best serve the own-
er's purpose. Water Rights in the Western 
States, 3d Ed. Wiel, Vol. 1, p. 38." 
If all the rest of our contentions are to be ruled against 
us, and now we a.re to be gov,erned by the ·1aw of waters, 
then we confidently assert the point last mentioned has 
not been and cannot be answered. 
Inasmuch as this court held in Utah Copper Co. vs. 
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., et al, 69 
Utah, at page 430-431, as follows: 
'"~*"" the waters carrying copper or other 
minerals in solution, so long as they are in the 
dump and thus a part of it, *** are, like the 
du,mp itself, the property of the plaintiff; that 
it is as lawful for the plaintiff, so long as the 
waters are in the dump, to coiled and remove 
them as it is to remove the dump itself; ***" 
applying by analogy the law of waters, counsel contend 
that the dump is as a spring in plaintiff's land, the 
water whereof wiU be plaintiff's property while within 
plaintiff's land. Carrying the conception further, no 
other conclusion can be indulged than that the waters 
from this spring, when leaving the Sipring, flow down 
a natural water course in a channel that is known and 
defined, and that plaintiff, in addition to its ownership 
while upon and within its land, filed upon those waters 
as waters of a natural stream flowing in a natural 
water course or channel known and defined, and there-
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in designated its point of diversion at the Hays Spring. 
Concluding the analogy and supplementing the fact that 
plaintiff is the owner of the water while on or in plain-
tiff's land, plaintiff filed upon it below, where it con-
stitutes the water of a natural stream, the Bingham & 
Garfield Railway Company having acquired the ancient 
rights to the stream before the creation of plaintiff's 
dumps or ''works for the reduction of ores;'' and sup-
plementing all those facts, we conclude the analogy by 
due recognition of the fact that defendants have not 
now and never had any right whatever to or interest 
in those waters as waters of a natural stream, never 
had any use for them as waters at all, and admittedly 
never wanted them. ''It is the copper only in the water 
that they seek." (Finding XVII, Tr. 4057, Abs. 612.) 
This court must conclude that the water as it leaves 
plaintiff's dump flows down Dixon Gulch as a natural 
stream in a natural water course along a natural chan-
nel that is known and defined, because the court below 
so found a:nd this court adopted that finding in the face 
of error assigned by defendants, and .again we rep~at 
the finding below which this court has adopted : 
(XXX, Tr. 4063, Abs. 620): 
"Now and at all times with which this cause 
is concerned the railroad fill, including the west-
edy slope thereof, is and had been porous and 
has at all said times amd does now freely .admit 
the passage of water and solutions from plain-
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tiff's dumps above. The westerly slope of that 
fill has not been sealed.'' 
to which defendants assigned error. (Assignment No. 
20, Abs. 705). 
(XXXII, Tr. 4064, Abs. 620): 
"The average grade of Dixon Gulch is about 
26°. The copper waters or solutions flowing at 
the so-called Hays Spring flow through and out 
of the railroad fill through, at or near the rock 
wall, but they do not flow from the sulphide vein 
and on the contrary are waters merely that have 
come to and into the railroad fill from and 
through plaint,iff 's dumps in Dixon Gulch above 
the railroad fill, have flowed and percolated 
down into and laterally through the railroad fill, 
have flowed down the bottom of Dixon Gulch on 
bedrock or on and through surface soil in the 
bottom of Dixon Gulch and emerged from the 
downhill slope and near the toe of the railroad 
fill in the bottom of Dixon Gulch. The course so 
pursued by said waters is definitely known and 
positively defrned, said course being Dixon Gulch 
down to, throug•h and aeross rrract D and tlte 
whole thm·eof and ·a•bove ·bedrock. ** * " (Ita lies 
ours). 
to which defendants assigned error (Assignment No. 22, 
Abs. 707). But ·in disposing of these assignments, this 
court properly held by its majority opinion that this 
being a law action, it was bound by the findings. The 
court below, having found that these waters flow in a 
known and defined channel, a natural stream, and this 
court having adopted that finding, we are not i,nsulting 
this court, nor are we disrespectful, nor are we guilty 
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of conduct that is at all censurable, nor are we doing 
anything but what our duty requires us to do when we 
assert earnestly and emphatically that no court ca.n 
rightly hold these copper solutions percolating waters 
title to which is in the defendants because this natural 
stream or .water course, this known and defined natural 
channel, traverses a part of defendants' land! A court 
may not rightly find waters those of a natural stream 
and then decree title thereto in the owner of the land 
t~aversed by the stream, the latter on the theory that 
.suc'h waters arc not the wwtcrs of a natnral•stf'e>am, but 
instead percolating waters! Such is the situation 1n 
which the major•ity opinion places this court. 
The dictionary definition of "percolate'' 1s "to 
Rtrain through; to pass or cause to pass through small 
interstices as a liquor; filter: literally and figurative-
ly." (Century) The Century definition of "seep" is 
''to (joze or .percolate gently; flow gently m drippingly 
through pores; trickle." Subterranean waters that 
neither seep nor percolate within those definitions 
Wlould indeed be rare. That subte:rr.ane<an waters both 
seep and percolate within those def.ini·tions is assumed 
when classifying them. Waters that percolate a•re of 
course very frequently not percolating water within 
certain legal definitions of such. Subterranean wa·ters 
seeping, flowing or percolating in defined and klllown 
channels may be percolating waters within the diction-
ary definition of such, but they certainly are not per-
7 
colating waters within the legal definition. Kinney on 
Irrigation and \Vater Rights, :2d Ed. Vol. :2, Ch. 6:2, p. 
:2149, § 1185 et seq. Likewise, of course, it is true that 
su1bterranean waters that flow may be percolating 
waters within the legal definition. It is not importm1t 
that such waters seep, flow or percolate, but it is all 
important that they do or do not seep, percolate or flow 
along channels or courses that are known or defined, 
knowledge of course or channel being the classifying 
tcritenion. 67 C. J. 836. 'Dhere .is nothing e.ither 
new <or startHng in this statement, this court like 
all others having frequently so held. Cres·cent Mining 
Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., (1898) 17 Utah 444, 70 
Am. St. Rep. 810, 54 Pac. 244; Herriman Irr. Co. v. 
Keel (1902), 25 Utah 96, 69 Pac. 719. In the case at 
bar the channel is well-krnown and defined. The court 
below so found, by which finding this court very proper-
ly confesses itself bound, and hence these waters can-
not be held percolating waters within the legal defini-
tion the majority opinion has wrongly applied. As held 
in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585, 
the waters of a subterranean stream are uot changed 
into percol:at1ing waters merely because the known and 
defined channel of the stream is filled to a considerable 
extent by boulders, sand, gravel and other porous 
materi'al, through w1hich the waters of the stream f•lmv. 
55 A. L. R. 1389. This ease was discussed in respond-
ent's brief at pages 80 to 84. 
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We call the court's attention to the following from 
the majority opinion in the case at bar: 
"**'* Nor do we see how it . can help the 
plaintiff's case to say that the waters or solu-
tions follo.w a known and defined oourse in pass-
in!{ from plaintiff's land across Tract D to the 
intake on Tract C, the known and defined course 
bwng Dixon Gulch. *'** There is no stream 
flowing in that gulch either upon or beneath the 
surfa'ce. The waters do not move with a current, 
as flowirig waters do, but in the manner usually 
referred to as by seeping and percolating; ex-
cept the so-called Hayes Spring waters, where 
they issue out of the toe of the fill, and the drain 
tunnel waters with which we are not concerned. 
This is so manifest that counsel for plaintiff fre-
quently use those very words in describing the 
manner of progression of the waters across 
Tract D. Therefore, the law pertaining to the 
right to the use of water flowing in streams does 
not apply to this situation; rund so it can make 
no difference that the waters find their way 
across Tract D from the west toward the east 
and between the walls of Dixon Gulch.'' 
We respectfully sutbmit that therein the court mils-s't'a,tes 
the law in this, that the .channel's 'being a natural stre~am 
channel that is known and defined, it would make no 
difference were there at times no stream naturally flow-
ing along its course, (in addition to the citations here-
tofore made, see 67 C. J. 1047, Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Gal. 
46) and m:is-1states the fact in this, that there is now and 
always has been a natural stream flowing in that gulch 
constantly throughout the year, the source of which has 
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always been N1e natural sprin~s at the hc:ad of the gulch, 
now augmented by the copper solutions from plaintiff's 
dumps, and 'aga1in mis-states the fact in this, that the 
waters flow with a very decided eurrent d'Own a 26° grade, 
,and ag1ain mis-states the law in this, that whether or not 
we deserihed in our brief's this :flow 'as ''seeping and per-
eolating" i,s, we most respectfully submit, of no interest 
or :importance whatev:er, the channel or course of ·such 
seepage or percolation being known and defined. Also, 
the majority oprnion makes an exception of the Hays 
Spring waters, but actually and under the findings of 
fact by the court below, adopted by this court, there ar·e 
no other waters here involved, the drain tunnel waters 
confessedly having been eliminated from this case. 
Surely the court misconstrued or overlooked the 
facts and those expressly found below and adopted here 
to have arrived at such a conclusion. The differenee 
it makes is that in this jurisdidion the owner of the 
land traYersed by the natural water course or stream 
bed can have no right, title or interest in the waters 
seeping, percol>ating or flowing therein, merely by reason 
of his ownership of the land. But in the excerpt quoted 
above from the majority opinion, the court refers to the 
"progression of the watm·s aer:oss 'rract D,'' and "that 
the waters find their way across Tract D from the 
we,st toward the east and between the walls of Dixon 
Gulch." vVe respectfully submit that by that definition 
the majority of this court by its opinion have remowd 
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these waters or solutions from the realm of percolating 
waters within the legal definition and have themselves 
in contmdi.ction of their conclusion defined them as 
waters flowing in a course that is kntown and defined, 
waters wherein the mere land owner can have no night, 
title, interest or claim. 
As long ago as Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Gal. 46, it was 
held by the supreme court of California that a ditcih 
company might use the natunaJl channel of the st~ream 
as a part of its ditch system without danger of abamdon-
ment of i·ts water or its right to divert that water below 
out of the natural channel, the court saying: 
"It would be a harsh rule ** to require those 
engaged in these enterprise.s to construct an 
•actual ditch along the whole route through which 
the waters were carried, and to refuse them the 
economy that nature occasionally afforded in the 
shape of a dry ravine, gulch, or canon. ***" 
and the supreme court reversed the trial court which 
had enjoined such diversi!on, the theory of the trial 
court being that once the water had been allowed to 
le1ave the possession of the ditch company and flow into 
and down the natuml channel, 1:1he ditch ·company ha!J 
abandoned it whatever might have been the dit'Ch com-
pany's intention with relati'on to its diveTsion from the 
e1·eek channe•l below. The supreme court held there was 
no abandonment, because the ditch company intended 
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to take its water out below. So far as we are aware, 
there has been unti,l now no derparture from that rule. 
Moreover, it seems to us that no one should lose 
sight of the fact we have asserted so often that these 
defendants are not interested in the waters, that 011 the 
contrary t,heir sole interest is in the copper which 1s 
wholly plaintiff's contribution and to the production of 
which defendants have contributed nothing, and never 
intend bo, and never will, contribute anything, copper 
that is the result solely of plaintiff's industry and in-
vestment. The water is a mere instrumentality for the 
conveyance of plaintiff's copper to plaintiff's precipi-
tating plant, and in conveying that copper the court 
below found, and thi,s court has adopted the finding, 
that plaintiff has availed itself of the natural stream or 
water course of Dixon Gulch, and that its waters so 
transp'orting its copper use and follow that natural 
channel or water course, which is both kno,wn and de-
fined. 
Is it any wonder that wo protest so emphatically 
the proposed seizure by defendants of this copper in 
the course of its transportation along this natural water 
course as a part of a natural stream, to plaintiff's 
facilities 1 \Ve are s,incerely of the opinion that there 
is no law and no analogy that will permit its seizure; 
that the present opinion of the majol"ity of this court 
stands alone in judicial decisions, an anomarly without 
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precedent to support it and wholly inconsistent within 
itself. rro upholu defendants' eontentJion that they may 
seize this copper as so transported in this natural 
stream, the bed of which traverses a part of defendant's 
property, 'is io grant defendants the right to avail them-
selves of the fruits of the capital and labor of the plain-
tiff without Clompensation to the plaintiff and without 
plaintiff's .consent and against plaintiff's will-a doc-
trrine too monstrous and absurd to be sanctioned by 
judicial authority. Hoffman vs. Stone, 7 Oalif. 46. 
It is a fundamental principle of the law that its 
rules must be "calculated to secure persons in their 
pi'Operty and possessiorns, and to preserve for them 
the fruits of their labors and expenditures." Katz v. 
Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116; 70 Pac. 663; 74 P1ac. 766; 
99 A.S.R. 35. The majmi·ty opinion of this court ignores 
that fundamental principle. In a;ll this debate it has not 
been de1nied, nor can it be denied, upon the record: 
1. rrhat while plaintiff's contribution in the future 
will quite likely be both water and c1opper, its present 
f•:ontribution to the so-called "waters" of Dixon Gulch 
is the copper in SO'lutim1, artificially produced by plain-
tiff, the intentional result of plaintiff's labor and in-
vestment, constituting a regular and legitimate phase 
of the mining, milling and metallurgical operations 
plaintiff was organized to carry on. 
·> That this copper in s1olution, pl•aintiff's contri-
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butiOIIl solely, is desired by these defendants, t'o the crea-
tion of which defendants have contri:buted nothing, will 
not •and never have intended to, contrrbute anything. 
3. That in the course of plruintiff's operations 
plaiintiff pmposed to utiilize the natural stream channel 
or creek bed in Dixon Gulch for the trnnspor1Jation of 
this copper in su1lution, so produced hy plaintiff, to plain-
tiff's diversion farcilit'ies situated in the natural stream 
bed upon Tract C, where are collected also plaintiff's 
similar copper solutions flowing through plaintiff's 
lines coming from the south, and as well the solutions 
from the drain tunnel in Dixun Gulch. 
4. That because this natural stream bed trav·erses 
a part of defendants' property, and by reason of that 
fact only, the defendants claim that the defendants ac-
quired title to such copper solutions while fol1owing this 
natural channel down Dixon Gulch to plraintiff's intake. 
5. But it is a s1ound and universrally recognized 
rule of law that: 
"A liquid or artificial increment ar.tificially 
produced and added to a natural stream or in-
troduced into a natural channel, by the labor of 
man without intent to abandon, belongs to the 
man whiose labor produced it or brought it there 
when naturally it would not have ex!isted there. 
1Such liquid increment may be taken out of the 
natural stream or channel by its owner and may 
be recaptured and reclraimed by him, at such 
point on the natul"al channel as may best serve 
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the owner's purpose. Water Rights in the vVest-
ern States, 3d Ed. Wiel, Vol. 1, p. 38. '' 
6. And it is a fundamenta;l principle of law t'hat 
its rules must be calculated to secure persons in their 
pi"operty a:nd pos:sessions and to preserve for them the 
fruits of their labors and expenditures. 
Upon that re,cord, whether or not the majority of 
this court may agree with the other grounds urged by 
us in support of our acti10n, we respectfully sUibmit that 
a revers:al of the judgment below is impossible. Were 
we w:itJhout respect for thi's court, we would not 'be mak-
ing here the effort now made to procure the withdrawal 
,of this majnrity opin~on, and we have no hesitancy in 
declaring here, manifesting thereby all due respect to 
this eourt without in:sult to amyone, that the major:ity 
opinion can result only in a gross miscarriage of justice 
if it be .allowed t'o ripen into the final judgment of this 
eJourt. Such a judgment upon this reemd in this suit 
ul1Cier the pleadings by which we are bound would be a 
denial of due process to thh; plaintiff in violati:on of 
the F'ederal eonstitution as heretofore stated, and like-
wise a denial to this plaintiff of the equal pr:otection of 
the l,aws. 
How absurd it is now for counsel to assert that 
the affirmative defens,e pleaded by defendants in their 
answers is a counterclaim! At the very commencement 
of the trial, when Judge Ritchie was endeavoring to 
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inf.orm himself concerning the pleadings and the issues 
to be tried, we were asked if we had filed a reply to the 
defendants' answers, to which question we replied we 
had not, that there was no matter pleaded that required 
a reply, that we stood upon the den~al afforded by the 
:statute under such circumstances; and in the course of 
t'hat disoussion, M.r. Parsons turned to Mr. Badger and 
asked him if he CJonst,rued his pleading as a counter-
claim, and Mr. Badger's answer w:as that he did not. 
That discussion apparently wa-s not tralllscribed by the 
report,er, and its occurrence must rest upon the reGol-
lecti:on of counsel. Had they regarded the answer as 
setting up a counterclaim, why did they not t~ake judg-
ment upon their ~ounterc1aim by default 1 The answer 
i~s in all respeJcts similar in form to that in any con-
demnation suit; it contaillls affirmative alleg1ations with 
relation to damages as answers in such suits always do; 
hut there 'is no eounterc1aim. 
It was never OUT contention that if the copper solu-
tions, for the transportation of which plaintiff seeks to 
oondemn an ea!sement, originated in defendants' lands 
as atleged by the defendants, that plaintiff could con-
demn them, and a~ordingly plaintiff did not attempt 
to condemn them. It wa~s also true that if the solutions 
were of the origin defendants contended f.or them, and 
therefore plaintiff would not own them, then there 
would 1be no occasion for plaintiff's acqui,sition of an 
easement for t:heir t~ransportation, and there would ac-
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eordingly be no reas,on for the suit. However, plain-
triff eontemled that the only copper solutions it sought 
to transport over the easement to be condemned were 
those plaintiff had produced in its dumps abov~e in 
Dixon Gul0h, of which plaintiff was the owner, that all 
partie~s oonceded to plaintiff ownership of the watefls 
in plaintiff's dumps; that all the solutions so to be 
transported by plaintiff came from thes~e dumps in 
Uixon Gule:h, washed out of the dumps by waters fall-
ing or placed thereupon, joining the natural creek flow 
from the springs aJbove and continuing t:heir course 
down the gulch in the natural creek channel acros'S the 
easement condemned to p~aintiff'is intake on Tract C-
so the Lower court found, aud this court declares itself 
hound by that finding. Hav1ing held th:at plaintiff is 
ex,presiSly within the statute ''S provisions conferring the 
rig'ht of e:rruinent domain, we insist th:at, having £ound 
botth £ads and law for the plaintiff, judgment heflein 
('an not be rightly revensed. 
Res.pedfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS 
& McCREA, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
17 
